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Abstract 
 
This study empirically finds, using ECM, that the primary federal budget deficit shares a bi-
directional relationship with the ex ante real interest rate yield on long term municipal bonds.  
That is, the primary budget deficit acts to raise the real municipal bond yield whereas that yield 
also acts to raise the primary deficit. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Recently in the U.S., federal government budget surpluses made a brief appearance. However, given the 
recession of 2001, the sluggish economy following the 2001 recession, a multi-year federal income tax rate cut statute 
passed in 2001, budgetary forecasts in light of the war on terrorism in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the U.S. 
on September 11, 2001, and Bush Administration and Democratic economic stimulus packages proposed in early 2003, 
the specter of federal budget deficits has appeared once again. Moreover, these circumstances in concert with other 
continuing and evolving military/national-security circumstances would appear to make the prospects for historically 
huge budget deficits well into the foreseeable future a veritable certainty. This observation was recently affirmed by 
Alan Krueger (2003), who warns that deficits have re-emerged as a major problem and that with the impending 
retirement of the first baby boomers, the Ared@ ink is likely to continue as far as the eye can see. 
 
 The effect of federal government budget deficits on interest rates in the U.S. has been investigated extensively 
by a number of researchers, including Barth et al., [1984, 1985], Barth et al., [1989], Carlson and Spencer [1975], 
Cebula [1988, 1991, 1997, 2000], Cebula and Belton [1993], Cukierman and Meltzer [1989], Evans [1985, 1987], 
Feldstein and Eckstein [1970], Findlay [1990], Hoelscher [1983, 1986], Holloway [1988], Johnson [1992], Mascaro 
and Meltzer [1983], McMillin [1986], Ostrosky [1990], Saltz [1998], Swamy et al., [1990], Tanzi [1985], and Zahid 
[1988]. Most of these empirical studies are couched within open or closed IS-LM or loanable funds models or variants 
of same. Many of these studies find that the budget deficit raises longer term rates of interest while not significantly 
affecting short term rates of interest. Because capital formation is presumably much more affected by long term than by 
short term interest rates, the inference has occasionally been made that these deficits may lead to "crowding out" 
[Carlson and Spencer, 1975; Cebula, 1985]. Alternatively stated, Alan Krueger (2003) has more recently observed that 
personal savings declined as the federal budget deficit ballooned during the 1980s and 1990s and has argued that, for 
the 1980s and 1990s, federal government borrowing both caused interest rates to rise and crowded out private 
investment. 
 
 A large portion of the deficit-interest rate literature neglects net international capital flows, thereby ignoring 
the potential direct or indirect interest-rate effects of capital flows in the global economy and raising a question of a 
possible omitted-variable bias [Penner, 1987]. Similarly, an even larger proportion of this literature ignores personal 
income tax rates, thereby raising the question of a possible omitted-variable bias on yet another level [cf. Cebula and 
Belton, 1993; Tanzi, 1985]. Potentially, this omission may be especially serious since such tax rates arguably can 
profoundly influence private sector spending and savings decisions (including those between taxable and tax free 
bonds), and hence federal government tax collections, transfer payments (such as unemployment benefits), and, as a 
result, budget deficits as well. 
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 Potentially even more significant than the two issues identified above is the fact that the federal budget deficit 
measures adopted most commonly in this literature, namely, the N.I.P.A. (National Income and Product Accounts) total 
budget deficit, the structural budget deficit, and the cyclical budget deficit, all include interest payments on the national 
debt. This presence of interest payments on the national debt in the budget-deficit measure raises the question of a 
possible fundamental mis-specification. This is because the interest rate is typically treated in these studies as the 
dependent variable, whereas interest payments on the national debt are simultaneously a major component of arguably 
the key right-hand-side variable, i.e., the budget deficit itself, with causality allegedly flowing uni-directionally from the 
budget deficit to the interest rate. To address this problem, the present study adopts the primary budget deficit as the 
deficit measure, a deficit specification that has received little attention [cf. Cebula and Rhodd, 1993]. Furthermore, 
changes in ex ante real long term interest rates presumably may either directly or indirectly alter the pace of real 
economic activity through changes in real private sector purchases, especially capital formation/investment; therefore, 
they also may affect tax revenues, government transfer payments, and the government budget deficit. Thus, although 
the possibility of a bi-directional budget deficit-real interest rate causality usually has been overlooked, it arguably 
should not have been so readily dismissed.  
 
 The present paper seeks to study the federal budget deficit/ex ante real long term interest rate relationship after 
addressing these three potential problems. The study adopts cointegration and error-correction model (ECM) estimation 
to investigate empirically the possibility that the direction of causality between federal budget deficits and the ex ante 
real long term interest rate may be bi-directional rather than simply uni-directional. As stated above, a flow of causality 
from the interest rate to the primary deficit is plausible because a rise in long term interest rates, especially ex ante real 
long term rates, should--according to the conventional wisdom--lead either directly or indirectly to a decline in real 
economic activity as aggregate investment outlays (and potentially other real private sector outlays as well) decline 
[Hoelscher, 1986]. Moreover, aside from obvious implications for the cyclical component of the total budget deficit in 
terms of diminished tax collections and increased government sector transfers, it follows further that to the extent that 
policymakers are sensitive to a slowing pace of real economic activity, the federal government budget deficit may also 
be increased through discretionary fiscal policies (such as increased federal government purchases or income tax rate 
cuts). In addition to examining this bi-directional causality issue, the model formally adopts (as noted above) the 
federal primary budget deficit (which excludes Treasury interest payments) as the deficit variable so as to avoid a 
possible mis-specification of the deficit measure. Finally, the model includes net international capital inflows as well as 
a federal personal income tax rate measure so as to avoid omitted-variable bias.  
 
 The focus in this study is on the ex ante real interest rate yield on Standard and Poors (S&P) high grade long 
term municipal bonds, whose interest payments are exempt from federal income taxation and, depending upon certain 
residency requirements, may be free of state and even local government income taxation as well. This interest rate yield 
has received comparatively little attention in the deficit-interest rate literature [cf. Cebula, 1990, 1991], yet may 
exercise profound financial, economic, and political impacts on states, counties, and municipalities. 
 
 Using seasonally adjusted quarterly data, the study period is 1973:2-1996:4. As recommended in Mayer 
[1990], the study period begins with 1973:2 because this is the quarter by which time the system of fixed exchange 
rates (Bretton Woods) had effectively collapsed. Thus, over the entire study period, there effectively is a uniform 
exchange rate system in place; this of course simplifies the inclusion of net international capital flows in the analysis. 
Because there was no entirely satisfactory way to allow for the numerous provisions and complexities of The Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997, the study period ends in 1996:4.  
  
The Empirical Framework 
 
 In developing the framework for the empirical analysis, the following intertemporal federal government 
budget constraint is introduced: 
 NDt+1 = NDt + Gt + Ft + RtNDt - Tt         (1) 
where: 
 NDt+1 = the outstanding national debt in period t+1 
 NDt = the outstanding national debt in period t 
 Gt = federal government purchases in period t 
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 Ft = federal government non-interest transfer payments in period t 
 Rt = average effective interest rate on the national debt in period t 
 Tt = federal government tax and other revenues in period t 
 
The total federal government budget deficit in period t (TDt) is the difference between NDt+1 and NDt: 
 
 TDt = NDt+1 - NDt = Gt + Ft + RtNDt - Tt             (2) 
 
Rather than focusing on the total budget deficit, this study focuses on the primary budget deficit, which excludes net 
interest payments made by the Treasury. The primary deficit (PDt) is given by: 
 
PDt = TDt - RtNDt = NDt+1 - NDt - RtNDt = Gt + Ft - Tt         (3) 
  
 One can incorporate the effects of: I, the federal income tax rate; EALR, the ex ante real interest rate yield on 
Standard & Poors (S&P) high grade long term municipal bonds; C, net international capital inflows; and EASR, the ex 
ante real short term taxable interest rate yield, into the model, as follows: 
F = f(EALR, C, OF1), fEALR > 0, fC < 0            (4) 
T = g(I, EALR, C, EASR, OF2), gI >< 0,gEALR < 0,gC > 0, gEASR >0       (5) 
G = h(EALR, OF3), hEALR >=0             (6) 
 
where OFz, z=1,...,3, refers to unspecified factors that may in part affect F, T, and G, respectively. 
 
 It is hypothesized in this empirical  investigation that plausible factors influencing F, T, and G may well 
include long-term interest rates, especially the ex ante real long term interest rate yield, EALR. If EALR were to rise, as 
a practical matter, then other markets competing for long-term loanable funds, including long term Treasury issues and 
private-sector mortgages, would presumably be faced with higher real interest rates as well, due to competition. To the 
extent that these higher real long term interest rates lead to reduced real economic activity, tax collections would likely 
fall and government transfers such as unemployment compensation would likely increase. Even discretionary 
government purchases might be increased and/or tax rates decreased to offset any recessionary trend from a higher 
EALR, especially in an election year. Furthermore, higher EALR levels might act to create interest-induced (negative) 
wealth effects (presumably in the form of declining bond prices), that themselves might act to reduce private sector 
spending and thereby to slow real economic activity. To the degree that these additional potential effects of a higher 
EALR are manifested, they might to some degree further act to raise F and lower T, if not potentially even affect G 
and/or I. In any case, a plausible outcome from increased levels of EALR would presumably be an increased primary 
budget deficit.  
 
 In theory, ceteris paribus, higher marginal federal personal income tax rates may lead to increased tax 
receipts. However, to the extent that a higher income tax rate reduces real economic activity (through reducing 
disposable real income and hence purchases of new goods and services) on the one hand and/or induces increased 
income tax evasion on the other hand [Feige, 1994; Tanzi, 1982, 1983], tax collections could potentially decline. 
Accordingly, the net impact of I on PD is (theoretically) unclear. Next, the greater the net inflow of international capital 
(C), the greater the supply of loanable funds and hence the more rapidly the economy is likely to expand, which 
presumably would act to lower F and raise T. Finally, the higher the ex ante real short term taxable interest rate yield in 
the economy, the higher the level of taxable income and thus the higher the level of tax collections. 
 
       Thus, the primary deficit is likely to be a function of I, EALR, C, and EASR, such that: 
 
 PD = j(I, EALR, C, EASR,...)        (7) 
where jI >< 0, jEALR > 0,  jC < 0, jEASR < 0        (8) 
 The intertemporal federal government budget constraint model provided above focuses on determinants of the 
primary budget deficit. To explain the determination of the ex ante real interest rate yield on S&P high grade long term 
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municipal bonds (EALR), including the impact of the primary deficit on same, an open-economy loanable funds model 
is adopted in which the ex ante real long term interest rate yield on municipal (tax free) bonds is determined by an 
equilibrium of the following form [Barth et al., 1985; Cebula, 1992, 1997; Hoelscher, 1986; Saltz, 1998]: 
 
 D + C = S + PD            (9) 
 
where: 
 
 D = real domestic demand for long term high grade municipal bonds 
 C = real net international capital inflows (as above) 
 S = real domestic supply of long term high grade municipal bonds 
 PD = real net borrowing by (the budget deficit of) the federal government, as measured by the primary budget 
deficit (as above). 
 
 In this framework, it is expected that: 
 D = D(EALR,I,EASR,...),  DEALR >0, DI  >0, DEASR < 0       (10) 
 S = S(EALR,...), SEALR < 0             (11) 
 C = C(EALR,...), CEALR > 0              (12) 
  
 It is expected that, in principle paralleling Barth et al., [1985], Cebula [1992, 1997], and Hoelscher [1986], the 
real domestic demand for long term high grade municipal bonds is an increasing function of their ex ante real interest 
rate yield, whereas the real domestic supply of long term high grade municipal bonds is a decreasing function of their 
ex ante real interest rate. Next, the higher the ex ante real short term taxable interest rate yield, EASR, the lower the 
demand for long term municipals as bond demanders substitute the shorter term instruments for the longer term ones at 
the margin, ceteris paribus [Hoelscher (1986)]. In addition, as suggested in Penner [1987, p. 123], it is expected that 
"...high real interest rates...would attract massive inflows of international capital." This Aattraction@ accounts for the 
expected positive sign on CEALR. Finally, the demand for long term high grade municipal bonds is an increasing 
function of income tax rates since higher income tax rates make tax free bonds relatively more attractive than taxable 
bonds, ceteris paribus. 
 
 Substituting equations (10), (11), and (12) into equation (9) and solving for EALR yields: 
 
 EALR = EALR(PD, C, I, EASR)         (13) 
such that: EALRPD > 0, EALRC < 0, EALRI < 0, EALREASR > 0                     (14)  
  
 The first of these three expected signs is positive in order to reflect the traditional argument that when the 
Treasury attempts to finance a primary budget deficit, it forces interest rates upwards as it competes for funds from the 
financial markets. The expected sign on the capital flows variable is negative because net capital inflows absorb 
domestic debt issues and presumably help offset the interest rate effects of primary budget deficits, as suggested in 
Cebula and Belton [1993]. The negative sign on EALRI reflects the increased demand and hence increased market 
price for (and lower yield on) long term high grade municipal bonds as income tax rates are elevated. Finally, the 
positive sign on EALREASR reflects competition between the long term municipal market and the short term taxable 
bond market [Hoelscher (1986)]. 
 
Variables and Data 
 
 The initial step in the analysis is to develop an appropriate empirical measurement of expected inflation. This 
determination is essential to the computation of the variables EALR and EASR. One possibility is to adopt the well-
known Livingston survey data. However, as observed by Swamy et al., [1990, p. 1013], there may be serious problems 
with the Livingston series: 
Studies by some psychologists have shown that the heuristics people have available for forming 
expectations cannot be expected to automatically produce expectations that come anywhere close to 
satisfying the normative constraints on subjective probability judgments provided by the Bayesian 
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theory. The failure of people to obey these constraints makes Livingston=s survey data incompatible 
with stochastic law...  
 
 Accordingly, following the lead by Swamy et al., [1990], rather than using the Livingston series, the study 
adopts a distributed lag model on actual inflation to construct the values for the expected inflation rate, Pte, for quarter t. 
In particular, to construct the values for Pte, a four-quarter distributed lag model of actual inflation (as measured by the 
annualized percent rate of change of the CPI, 1996=100.0) was used. The analysis also experimented with three-, five-, 
six-, seven-, and eight-quarter distributed lag models of actual inflation to generate the expected inflation values; 
however, while the empirical results were similar, the four-quarter lag provided the best forecasting model, as in 
Cebula [1997] and Swamy et al., [1990]. It should be noted that use of the average of actual inflation rate in the most 
recent four quarters to estimate expected inflation, as suggested in Al-Saji [1993], produces results entirely consistent 
with, and indeed very similar to, the findings of the present study. 
 
 Based on the framework expressed in Section II above, the following variables are included in the empirical 
analysis: 
 
 PDYt = the ratio of the seasonally adjusted nominal primary federal budget deficit in quarter t to the 
seasonally adjusted nominal GDP in quarter t, as a percent 
 
 EALRt = the ex ante real average interest rate yield on S&P long term high grade municipal bonds, as a 
percent per annum; in particular, EALRt = the nominal average interest rate yield in quarter t on S&P high grade long 
term municipal bonds (as a percent per annum) minus the expected inflation rate in quarter t (as a percent per annum, 
Pte) 
 
 EASRt = the ex ante real average interest rate yield on shorter term, in this case, 52 week U.S. Treasury bills 
in quarter t; in particular, EASRt = the nominal average interest rate yield in quarter t on 52 week U.S. Treasury bills 
(as a percent per annum) minus the expected inflation rate in quarter t (as a percent per annum, Pte) 
 
 It = the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate in quarter t, as a percent 
 
 CYt = the ratio of the seasonally adjusted nominal net international inflow of capital in quarter t to the 
seasonally adjusted nominal GDP in quarter t, as a percent. 
 
 The primary budget deficit is scaled by the GDP level, as are net international capital inflows. This is because 
the primary budget deficit and international capital inflows should both be judged relative to the size of the economy, 
as in Hoelscher [1986], Evans [1985, 1987], Cebula [1997], Holloway [1986], and Ostrosky [1990]. The EASR 
variable adopts the 52 week U.S. Treasury bill rate not only because it is relatively shorter term than the long term 
municipal bond rate but also because it may be regarded as a high quality and therefore viable alternative to high grade 
municipals. The variable It represents the personal income tax rate variable, I, in the model developed above. The 
maximum marginal rate is chosen because it is the rate at which municipal bonds should be the most appealing. 
However, it is noted that use of the average effective federal personal income tax rate rather than It leaves the results 
and conclusions nearly unchanged. The study period, using quarterly data, is 1973.2-1996.4. 
 
 The data sources are, as follows:  
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [2002]: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/H15/data; 
The Council of Economic Advisors [1974, Table C-58; 1979, Table B-65; 1984, Table B-67; 1989, Table B-71; 1992, 
Table B-69;  
1995, Table B-72; 1998, Table B-71; 2002, Table B-73]; 
Bureau of Labor Statistics [2002, Tables 1.1 and 3.2]: 
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=N; 
Tax Facts, Urban Institute Brookings Institution [2002]: 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxFacts/individual/schedule.cfm. 
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Initial Empirical Analysis  
 
 It is necessary in the empirical analysis to test the variables in the analysis for order of integration and 
cointegration. To begin this process, the results of the Phillips- Perron (P-P) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests 
for a unit root were performed. All of the variables in the system were found to be stationary in first differences, as 
reported in Table 1. The choice of lag length was determined using the SBC criterion. 
 
 
 TABLE 1 
 P-P and ADF Unit Root Test-Statistics 
  P-P Statistics  ADF Statistics 
 Variable     First Differences           
 PDY  -10.09**  -5.06** 
 EALR  -5.06**  -4.88** 
 I    -9.56**        -4.36** 
 EASR  -4.73**  -8.61** 
 CY  -8.56**  -4.48** 
** Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root atthe 99 percent confidence level (99% critical value = -3.51) 
  
 
 Since all five series in this analysis contain a unit root in levels, but are stationary in first differences, all 
causality tests must be performed in first differences. Furthermore, to determine the correct specification of the 
causality test, we must test for cointegration among the variables. This is accomplished using the Johansen [1990] 
cointegration test. In order to perform the Johansen cointegration test, we must first determine the appropriate lag-
length to be used to estimate the VAR (Vector Auto-Regressive) model below: 
     p 
 [Yt] = [a] + ∑ [bi][Yt-i] + [ut]        (15) 
    i=1  
where [ ] indicates a matrix, [a] is the matrix of constant terms, and [ut] is the matrix of stochastic error terms.  The lag 
length p is so chosen that it minimizes the final prediction error using log-likelihood ratio tests and ensures that all ut 
are white noise. In the present model, p was determined to be 4.  
 
 Empirical testing reveals that CY contains a deterministic trend. Accordingly, the Johansen cointegration 
procedure was applied to the model with a deterministic trend on the one hand and then alternatively to the model 
without a deterministic trend in order to test for which form of the model is more appropriate.  We find that, according 
to the likelihood-ratio test, we can at the 95 percent confidence level reject that the VAR contains a deterministic trend. 
Accordingly, the results of the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests, using p = 4 but excluding a  deterministic trend, 
are provided in Table 2. 
 
 TABLE 2 
  Basic Cointegration Test Results    
  Trace Test       Maximum Eigenvalue Test  
Rank L.L.R   5% c.v.   1% c.v.____  L.L.R.  5% c.v.  1% c.v.  ____  
r>=0 121.23**  109.99  119.80   r=0 73.46** 59.46 66.52 
r>=1  78.98         82.49   90.45    r=1 39.26* 36.36 41.00 
 
**Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 99% confidence level; *indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 95% confidence level. 
L.L.R. is log-likelihood ratio and c.v. is the critical value. 
 
 Adopting the one percent level of significance as the appropriate criterion, the trace and maximum eigenvalue 
test statistics both indicate that the cointegration matrix is rank 1. Thus, testing for causality among the variables 
requires the use of the error-correction model (ECM), which in this case must be estimated using one error-correction 
term in order to avoid mis-specification.  The error-correction term is the normalized cointegrating vector, z1t, as given 
below:1 
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z1t = + 1.0 EALRt(-1)+ 221.4 PDYt(-1) + 0.611 It(-1) B 16.58 CYt (-1) - 1.225 EASRt(-1)    (16)  
 
 Testing for causality between PDYt and EALRt in the ECM requires not only checking the statistical 
significance of the lagged independent variables, but also checking the statistical significance of the error-correction 
term. We proceed with testing for causality by estimating the full ECM used to test for cointegration.  This ECM 
contains 4 lags of each exogenous variable and one error-correction vector. The parameters of the ECM are estimated 
using OLS, correcting for heteroskedasticity using Newey-West heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
covariances. In the interest of efficiency, and given the emphasis in this study on the primary budget deficit and the ex 
ante real interest rate yield on high grade long term municipal bonds, only the ECM estimates for each of these two 
variables are provided in the following section of this study.2  
The ECM Results   
 The estimate for the primary budget deficit variable is: 
vPDYt =  -0.166vPDYt-1 +0.175 vPDYt-2 + 0.07 vPDYt-3 +0.057 vPDYt-4 
    (-1.48)  (+1.49)     (+0.59)       (+0.52) 
 
+ 0.001 vEALRt-1 +0.00097 vEALRt-2 +0.0012 vEALRt-3 + 0.0014 vEALRt-4 
(+0.96)  (+0.93)  (+1.15)  (+1.36) 
 
 +0.344 vCYt-1 -0.183 vCYt-2 - 0.511 vCYt-3 - 0.555 vCYt-4          
(+1.56)  (-0.83) (-2.30)*    (-2.39)** 
 
-0.004 vIt-1 +0.027 vIt-2 + 0.024 vIt-3 +0.023 vIt-4 
(-0.22)  (+1.44)    (+1.19) (+1.14) 
 
-0.0039 vEASRt-1 -0.0015 vEASRt-2 -0.0018 vEASRt-3 - 0.0014 vEASRt-4 
(-3.67)** (-1.23)       (-1.64)          (-1.28) 
 
- 0.001 z1t           
(-4.35)**    
 
R2 = 0.43, Ll=350.12           (17) 
**Indicates statistically significant at 1% level 
*Indicates statistically significant at 5% level 
where terms in parentheses are t-values and "v" is the first-differences operator. 
 
 In equation (17), the estimated coefficient on z1t is negative and statistically significant at the one percent 
level, whereas the estimated coefficients on the lagged EALR terms (although all positive) are not statistically 
significant. Thus, based on error-correction term results, the ex ante real interest rate yield on S&P high grade long 
term municipal bonds positively causes, i.e., exercises a net positive and significant impact on the primary budget 
deficit. Interestingly, from equation (17), based on the negative coefficients on vCYt-3 and vCYt-4 and based on the 
negative and significant coefficient on z1t, it also appears that net capital inflows act to negatively cause the primary 
budget deficit. Next, based on the result for the income tax variable in z1t, it appears that the maximum marginal 
federal personal income tax rate positively causes the primary budget deficit. Finally, based on the negative, significant 
coefficient on vEASRt-1 and the negative, significant coefficient on z1t, the primary budget deficit is negatively caused 
by the ex ante real taxable short term interest rate yield, as hypothesized in (8).  
 The estimate for the ex ante real interest rate yield on S&P high grade long term municipal bonds is given by 
equation (18): 
EALRt=  + 33.73vPDYt-1  +10.26 vPDYt-2   +14.76 vPDYt-3 + 23.43 vPDYt-4 
     (+2.57)** (+0.74)    (+1.02)  (+2.18)* 
 
- 0.o81 vEALRt-1 - 0.03 vEALRt-2 - 0.13 vEALRt-3 - 0.202 vEALRt-4 
(-0.64)     (-0.25)    (-1.07)    (-1.67) 
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+13.45 vCYt-1 B 42.75 vCYt-2 + 41.54 vCYt-3 B 14.28 vCYt-4 
(+0.52)  (-2.65)**    (+1.60)  (-0.53) 
 
+1.622 vIt-1 B 1.447 vIt-2  -2.586 vIt-3 - 2.91 vIt-4 
(+0.76)   (-0.64)  (-1.12)   (-2.21)* 
 
-0.012 vEASRt-1 +0.054 vEASRt-2 +0.151 vEASRt-3 +0.155 vEASRt-4 
(-0.10)    (+0.39)    (+1.19)        (+1.97)*    
 
-0.0289 z1t  
(-1.04)   
 
R2 = 0.29, Ll=-78.51          (18) 
 
 The estimated coefficient on z1t fails to be statistically significant; hence, inferences from equation (18) are 
based solely on the lagged coefficients. The estimation shown in equation (18) reveals that the coefficient for vPDYt-1 
is both positive and statistically significant at the one percent level, whereas the coefficient for vPDYt-4 is positive and 
statistically significant at the five percent level. These results both imply that the primary budget deficit positively 
"causes" the ex ante real interest rate yield on S&P high grade long term municipal bonds, despite the non-significance 
of the error-correction term. This finding, in combination with the results reported in equation (17), suggests strongly 
that there exists a bi-directional causality between the primary budget deficit and the ex ante real interest rate yield on 
S&P high grade long term municipal bonds. The interested reader might note that equation (18) also reveals that capital 
inflows and the income tax rate both act to negatively cause EALR, and EASR acts to positively cause EALR, as 
hypothesized in (13) and (14). In closing this section of the paper, it is observed that the ECM results for only one 
of the variables, PDY, yields a statistically significant error-correction term. Since the error-correction term for the 
EALR variable is not statistically significant, there should be little concern about serious simultaneity problems in the 
system.  
Conclusion 
 The Aconventional wisdom@ argues that, ceteris paribus, the federal budget deficit acts to elevate the long 
term rate of interest. Despite the appearance and high visibility of Ricardian Equivalence arguments and studies based 
thereupon, a number of studies in recent years have provided empirical support for the conventional wisdom.  
 
 The present study has used cointegration and error-correction model (ECM) techniques to investigate the 
causality relationship between the federal budget deficit and the ex ante real interest rate yield on high grade long term 
municipal bonds. To avoid a possible mis-specification, (1) the primary budget deficit, which excludes Treasury net 
interest payments, is adopted as the federal budget deficit measure, (2) a federal income tax rate measure is included in 
the system, and (3) net international capital flows are included in the analysis. The use of the primary deficit permits 
evaluation of whether there may exist economic reasons for an impact of the ex ante real long term interest rate on the 
deficit. 
 
 In this study, strong empirical support is provided indicating a bi-directional relationship between the ex ante 
real interest rate yield on S&P high grade long term municipal bonds and the primary budget deficit of the federal 
government in the U.S. over the 1973:2-1996.4 period. Thus, it appears that factors elevating the primary federal 
budget deficit act to raise the real cost of borrowing for state, county, and local governments, presumably through 
increasing the competition for loanable funds. To the extent that other real rates of interest are also affected by primary 
deficits, long term growth and productivity in the private sector may be adversely affected as well. Thus, federal 
government policies that raise the primary budget deficit cannot be viewed in a vacuum because they may impact 
profoundly on significant market interest rate yields, state and local government finances, and private sector 
productivity and growth. Krueger=s (2003) recently expressed concerns are well founded. 
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Footnotes 
 
1 The normalized equation is of the form: z = -b0 - bwj where w is a vector of j right-hand-side variables. 
2 The ECM results for other variables will be provided upon written request.  
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